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The Bankruptcy of Refusing to Hire





In 1978, Congress made it illegal for government employers to deny em-
ployment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to
employment against a person who has filed bankruptcy. In 1984, Congress
extended this prohibition to private employers by making it illegal for such
employers to terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to
employment against a person who has filed bankruptcy. Under the law as it
currently exists, private employers can refuse to hire a person who has filed
bankruptcy solely because that person has filed for bankruptcy. Meanwhile,
employers have substantially increased their use of credit history checks as a
pre-employment screening device. Credit history checks will disclose bank-
ruptcy filings, and because blacks and Latinos are overrepresented among
bankruptcy filers, these groups are disproportionately affected by bankruptcy
discrimination. This disparate impact probably violates Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Moreover, there is scant empirical support for the pro-
position that creditworthiness is a reliable proxy for workplace performance
or employee trustworthiness.
Relying on bankruptcy status simpliciter is antithetical to a core purpose
of the bankruptcy system, which is to give debtors a fresh start. Employers'
prerogatives to operate according to whatever employment policies and prac-
tices they want should be balanced against employees' and potential employ-
ees' right to participate in the labor market in an environment free of
*Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law. The law
school where I am honored and privileged to teach provided a research grant in order for me to write this
Article. I am very grateful to Professor Michael D. Sousa of the University of Denver Sturm College of
Law, who served as my editor for this Article and showed me tremendous patience and courtesy while
doing so. Any errors are solely my responsibility. Finally, I am grateful to every author whose work I
cited. All of you have made valuable contributions to the subject of balancing an employer's prerogative to
hire or refuse to hire a person on any terms that it sees fit with the employee's right to work or attempt to
work in an environment that is free of irrational discrimination. I hope this Article does likewise.
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irrational discrimination. It is irrational to deny employment to a person who
is or was a debtor if the person is otherwise qualified, and the job can be
successfully performed regardless of bankruptcy status. To allow such dis-
crimination makes the bankruptcy system's promise of a fresh start illusory.
INTRODUCTION.
One of the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code is to give those who seek its
protections a "fresh start" from the financial problems that caused them to file
bankruptcy in the first place.' In order to effectuate the fresh start principle
of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress enacted 11 U.S.C. § 525 on November 6,
1978.2 Section 525 prohibits government employers from denying employ-
ment to, terminating the employment of, or discriminating with respect to
employment against a person who is or has been a debtor, or who is or has
been associated with a debtor.3 On July 10, 1984, Congress extended this
non-discrimination principle to private employers by enacting 11 U.S.C.
§ 525(b), which prohibits private employers from terminating the employ-
ment of, or discriminating with respect to employment against a person who
is or has been a debtor, or who is or has been associated with a debtor.4
Under § 525, government employers are expressly prohibited from "de-
nying employment to" persons who have filed bankruptcy or who are cur-
rently in a bankruptcy proceeding,5 but private employers are not.6 Despite
the absence of an express prohibition on private employers refusing to hire a
debtor, an issue has arisen in the courts on the question of whether private
employers, like their government counterparts, are prohibited from "denying
employment to" a person because that person is or has been in bankruptcy,
and every court that has addressed the question except one has held that
§ 525(b) does not prohibit private employers from refusing to hire a person
'Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244
(1934)).
'Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549-2688 (1978); S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 1 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 3-5 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.CA.N. 5964-67. The law went into effect on October 1, 1979.
'Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, Title I, § 525, 92 Stat. 2549, 2593 (1978) (codified as 11
U.S.C. § 525).
4Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, Title III, § 309, 98
Star. 333, 352, 354-55 (1984). Section 525(b) became effective for cases filed on or after October 9, 1984.
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, Title III, § 553(a), 98
Stat. 333, 352, 392 (1984); Madison Madison Int'l of Ill., P.C. v. Matra, SA. (In re Madison Madison Int'l
of Ill., P.C.), 77 BR. 678, 680 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987). This legislation also renumbered the original § 525
as § 525(a). Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, Title III,
§ 309, 98 Stat. 333, 352, 354-55 (1984).
511 U.S.C. § 525(a).
611 U.S.C. § 525(b).
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who is or has been a debtor.7 Alongside judicial decisions ratifying private
employers' right to refuse to hire debtors, is the widespread practice of em-
ployers using credit history checks as a pre-employment screening device.8
Some of the reasons employers give for running credit history checks on ap-
plicants for employment include reducing the likelihood of theft, fraud, em-
bezzlement, and other criminal activity, managing liability for negligent
hiring, assessing the overall trustworthiness of applicants, and compliance
with state laws that mandate background checks.9 There is a debate among
'Compare Myers v. TooJay's Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278, 1283-87 (11th Cir. 2011) (§ 525(b) does
not cover a refusal to hire); Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc. (In re Burnett), 635 F.3d 169, 171-74 (5th Cir.
2011) (same); Rea v. Federated Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 940-41 (3d Cit. 2010) (same); Fiorani v. CACI,
192 B.R. 401, 404-07 (E.D. Va. 1996) (same); Pastore v. Medford Say. Bank, 186 BR. 553, 554-55 (D.
Mass. 1995) (same); Martin v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. (In re Martin), Adversary No. 07-7067, Bank-
ruptcy No. 06-41010, 2007 WL 2893431, at *1-5 (Bankr. D. Kan. Sept. 28, 2007) (same); Stinson v. BB &
T Inv. Servs., Inc. (In re Stinson), 285 B.R. 239, 241-50 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2002) (same), and In re Hardy,
209 BR. 371, 374-79 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997) (§ 525(b) applies only if the debtor is an employee of the
defendant, and a person who has not been hired is not an employee); In re Bobbitt, 174 B.R. 548, 552
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993) (same); In re Briggs, 143 B.R. 438, 443-45 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992) (same); In re
Henry, 129 B.R. 75, 78 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991) (same); Spaulding v. Citizens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of
Dayton (In re Spaulding), 116 BR. 567, 569, 571-73 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (same); In re Hopkins, 81
B.R. 491, 494 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987) (same); Madison Madison Int'l of Ill., P.C. v. Matra, S-A. (In re
Madison Madison Int'l of Ill., P.C.), 77 B.R. 678, 680, 682 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987) (same), with Leary v.
Warnaco, Inc., 251 BR. 656, 658-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (§ 525(b) prohibits private employers from refusing
to hire a debtor just as § 525(a) prohibits government employers from refusing to hire a debtor), and
Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264, 1268-69 (9th Cir. 1990) (The court
affirmed an order granting summary judgment in favor of the employer because the plaintiff did not prove
that the employer's sole reason for refusing to hire her was its knowledge of her bankruptcy filing. This
suggests that had the plaintiff proved that the employer's sole reason for refusing to hire her was its
knowledge of her bankruptcy, the court would have reversed the order granting the employer's motion for
summary judgment on the § 525(b) refusal to hire issue.).
'Roberto Concepci6n, Jr., Pre-Employment Credit Checks: Effectuating Disparate Impact on Racial
Minorities Under the Guise of job-Relatedness and Business Necessity, 12 SCHOLAR 523, 530-35 (2010) (in
2003, 35% of employers used credit checks compared with 19% in 1996; in 2008, 38.7% of retailers used
credit history checks as a pre-employment screening measure, and estimated that in 2009 retailers' reliance
on credit history checks increased by 7.6%); Beverley Earle, Gerald Madek & David Missirian, The Legal-
ity of Pre-Employment Credit Checks: A Proposed Model Statute to Remedy an Inequity, 20 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 159, 167-68 (2012) (The Society for Human Resources Management found that 13% of
businesses perform credit checks on all candidates and 47% on some candidates.); Taylore Karpa, Note,
"An Equal Opportunity Employer": Proposed Judicial and Legislative Solutions to Restrict the Disparate
Impact Caused by Employer use of Credit Checks, 49 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 83, 85-86 (2014) (60% of employ-
ers use credit checks as a hiring tool, which is a 35% increase from 2001); Adam T. Klein, ReNika Moore
& Scott A. Moss, Employer Credit-History Checks and Criminal Record Checks of Job Applicants for
Hiring Decisions: The Illegality Under Title VII Disparate Impact Doctrine, at The 13th Annual Corporate
Counsel Institute, Georgetown University Law Center Continuing Legal Education, March 12-13, 2009,
2009 WL 2432291, at *1-6 (Mar. 12, 2009) (A 2004 study by the Society of Human Resource Manage-
ment found that "[m]ore employers [we]re using credit checks in 2003 (35%) compared to 1996 (19%)" as
a way to "investigate the backgrounds of potential employees."); Lea Shepard, Seeking Solutions to Finan-
cial History Discrimination, 46 CONN. L. REv. 993, 1003-1005 (2014) (citing surveys showing that 60% of
employers used credit reports in 2010, compared to 35% of employers in 2003 and 19% in 1996).
9
Concepci6n, supra note 8, at 537-39; Earle, Madek & Missirian, supra note 8, at 167-68 (54% of
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commentators on the question of whether an applicant's credit history is a
fair predictor of whether the applicant might steal from his or her employer,
or whether the applicant is mature, responsible, trustworthy, honest, reliable,
has integrity, has good judgment, and is capable of handling the pressures of a
job.' 0 The majority view among the commentariat is that credit history
checks are unreliable proxies for the kind of characteristics that employers
seek in job applicants." There are, however, commentators who reach the
opposite conclusion.'2
A credit check will disclose a bankruptcy, and on average, black and La-
tino' 3 Americans have lower credit scores than white Americans'4 partly
employers conducted credit checks in order to reduce the likelihood of theft, embezzlement, and other
criminal activity; 27% did in order to manage legal liability for negligent hiring; 12% did in order to assess
the overall trustworthiness of the applicant; 7% did in order to comply with applicable state laws that
mandate background checks); Klein, Moore & Moss, supra note 8, at *5-6; Shepard, supra note 8, at 1002-
11.
'oConcepci6n, supra note 8, at 537-41 (there is little to no relationship between credit history and job
performance); Earle, Madek & Missirian, supra note 8, at 163-72 (there is a lack of demonstrable evidence
connecting credit reports to predicting an applicant's criminal behavior or job performance); Klein, Moore
& Moss, supra note 8, at *3-6 ("There is a complete absence of evidence that employee credit checks are
job-related at all, much less consistent with business necessity, for any job - and there is substantial
evidence that the credit records that employers check are based on factors substantially unrelated to any
aspect of the performance of any job. To our knowledge, credit checks as a basis for employment decisions
is a practice validated by no studies, much less by studies meeting the strict standard of proof justifying a
job requirement imposing a disparate impact.") (emphasis in original); Lea Shepard, Toward a Stronger
Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1695, 1711-22 (2012) (noting that there is
little empirical support for the proposition that employees or applicants for employment who have finan-
cial problems are more prone to commit theft, fraud, or accept bribes). But see Robert J. Landry & Benja-
min Hardy, Bankrupts Need Not Apply: Sound Hiring Policy or Dangerous Proposition?, 7 VA. L. & Bus.
REv. 47, 57-60 (2012) ("A past bankruptcy may serve as a proxy for responsibility, honesty, judgment, and
good management skills, particularly when it comes to handling money or property." The authors also said
that "drawing these kinds of conclusions about individuals based solely on bankruptcy status is stereotyp-
ing that may or may not be true in a given situation."); James D. Phillips & David D. Schein, Utilizing
Credit Reports for Employment Purposes: A Legal Bait and Switch Tactic?, 18 RICH. J. L. & PUB. INT. 133,
155 (2015) ("A 2004 study indicates that financial stress can impact work performance. While not an
overwhelming number of studies validate the work performance - good credit link, there are at least some
good quality and fairly recently reported studies [that] validate the use of credit reports for screening
applicants.").
"Concepci6n, supra note 8, at 537-41; Earle, Madek & Missirian, supra note 8, at 163-72; Klein,
Moore & Moss, supra note 8, at *3-6; Shepard, supra note 10, at 1711-22.
12Landry & Hardy, supra note 10, at 57-60; Phillips & Schein, supra note 10, at 153-55.
13I dislike the terms "Hispanic" and "Latino" because they both fail to account for the marked geo-
graphic, cultural, and in some instances, language differences that exist among the groups that the terms
attempt to describe. On the other hand, a proper accounting of those differences in the course of a written
or oral discussion can be unwieldy. For the purposes of this article, "Latino" includes persons of Mexican,
Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central American, South American, or other Spanish origin countries or cultures,
regardless of their race. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(B).
1 Concepci6n, supra note 8, at 530-35 (finding that counties with very low risk credit scores, those
between 720 and 850, had a population of 5% black and Latino while counties with very high risk credit
scores, between 500 to 559, had a population of 49% black and Latino. Moreover, this study found that
27% of whites have a bad credit record while 48% of blacks and 34% of Latinos have a bad credit record.);
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because black families are more than three times as likely to file bankruptcy as
white families, and Latino families are almost twice as likely to file bank-
ruptcy as white families.'5 Black and Latino persons are overrepresented
among bankruptcy filers, which means black and Latino persons are probably
disproportionately impacted by employers' use of credit checks as a pre-em-
ployment screening device.16
Some believe that the primary reason people file bankruptcy is because of
profligate spending.'7 It is true that financial recklessness leads some to the
doorsteps of the bankruptcy courthouse, but it is untrue that the majority of
persons who file bankruptcy do so because they refused to cut up the credit
card.8 Job losses, medical problems, and divorce account for 85% to 90% of
bankruptcy filings,'9 and in 2012, the "median average monthly income" of
the 1.1 million persons who filed for personal bankruptcy was $2,743, while
their "median average monthly expenses" were $2,769, a mere $26
difference.20
Earle, Madek & Missirian, supra note 8, at 186-87; Karpa, supra note 8, at 84, 88-89 (on average, whites
have a 21% higher credit score than blacks); Klein, Moore & Moss, supra note 8, at *2 (blacks have bad
credit records at a 21% higher rate than whites); Shepard, supra note 10, at 1042.
"Abbye Atkinson, Modifng Mortgage Discrimination in Consumer Bankruptcy, 57 ARiz. L. REv.
1041, 1074-75 (2015); Elizabeth Warren, The Economics of Race: When Making It to the Middle Is Not
Enough, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1777, 1786 (2004). The rates of bankruptcy filings by race come from a
2001 crosssectional study of bankruptcy filers called the "2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project." Atkinson,
supra at 1074-75; Warren, supra at 1779, 1786.
"'Concepci6n, supra note 8, at 526, 529-41; Earle, Madek & Missirian, supra note 8, at 161-72; Karpa,
supra note 8, at 86-90; Klein, Moore & Moss, supra note 8, at *1-6; Landry & Hardy, supra note 10, at 54-
56; Shepard, supra note 10, at 1010-13, 1041-44. But see Phillips & Schein, supra note 10, at 156 ("While
often alleged by opponents of the use of credit reports, the anecdotal evidence suggests that minorities are
not necessarily disadvantaged by the use of credit reports.").
"Earle, Madek & Missirian, supra note 8, at 167; Elizabeth Warren, The Over-Consumption Myth
and Other Tales of Economics, Law, and Morality, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1485, 1492-1503 (2004).
"Earle, Madek & Missirian, supra note 8, at 167 ('People spend 21% less on clothing than they did in
the early 1970's, and families today often conserve financial resources by shopping at low-cost, high-
volume retailers such as Wal-Mart. The cost of appliances has dropped, but necessary expenses like mort-
gages, health insurance, transportation, and child care have increased dramatically. Families typically spend
around 75% of their income on essential goods, leaving little room in the budget for luxury purchases.");
Warren, supra note 17, at 1492-1503.
"Concepci6n, supra note 8, at 541; Warren, supra note 17, at 1492-1503.
20
Office of Inspector General, United States Postal Service, Providing Non-Bank Financial Services for
the Underserved, at 14, (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-
files/2015/rarc-wp-14-007_0.pdf (last visited May 14, 2016); 2012 Report of Statistics Required by the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (Dec. 31, 2012), at 5, 6, http://
www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/all/bankruptcy-abuse-prevention-and-consumer-protection-act-bapcpa
/2012/12/31 (last visited July 25, 2017). "Debtors calculate their average monthly incomes and average
monthly expenses and report them to the courts on line 16 of Schedule I (income) and line 18 of Schedule J
(expenses). The [Administrative Office of the United States Courts] then calculates the median of the
average monthly incomes reported by debtors for all districts and circuits." 2012 Report of Statistics
Required by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, supra at 6 n.2.
(emphases added).
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Gainful employment is essential to obtaining financial stability or recover-
ing from a financial setback. Denying a person a job because he or she is or
was in bankruptcy is untenable if personal creditworthiness is not a reasona-
ble measurement of job performance.21 A survey of the available case law
shows that employers have refused to hire persons for the following positions
because the applicants had once been debtors in bankruptcy: an unspecified
job at a title company;22 a job as a project manager;23 an unspecified job with
an insurance company;24 a job as an executive assistant;25 a job as a paralegal
for a government contractor;26 and a job as a customer service representative
at a bank.27 In each of these cases, the employer did not "look beneath" the
applicant's bankruptcy filing to determine if the person actually lacked any of
the personal character traits the employer wanted in an employee.28 Instead,
the employers used bankruptcy status simpliciter as the reason to deny the
person a job.2 9
Personal creditworthiness can probably be linked to the successful per-
formance of jobs that require financial expertise like hedge fund managers,
investment portfolio managers, chief financial officers, stock or securities trad-
ers, or investment advisors. Thus, one should hesitate before quarreling with
the notion that bankruptcy status should play some role in deciding whether
to hire a person for those or similar jobs. The same cannot be said for an
unspecified job at a title company, a job as a project manager, an unspecified
job with an insurance company, a job as an executive assistant, a job as a
paralegal for a government contractor, and a job as a customer service repre-
sentative at a bank.30
21Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
22Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc. (In re Burnett), Bankruptcy No. 06-34312-H4-13, Adversary No.
08-03239, 2008 WL 4609983, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2008).
23Rea v. Federated Investors, 431 BR. 18, 20 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 627 F.3d 937, 938-941 (3d Cir. 2010).
24Martin v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. (In re Martin), Adversary No. 07-7067, Bankruptcy No.
06-41010, 2007 WL 2893431, at *1 (Bankr. D. Kan. Sept. 28, 2007).
2 5Leary v. Warnaco, Inc., 251 BR. 656, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
26Fiorani v. CACI, 192 B.R. 401, 403-04 (E.D. Va. 1996).
27Pastore v. Medford Say. Bank, 186 B.R. 553, 554 (D. Mass. 1995).
"In re Burnett, 635 F.3d 169 at 171; Rea, 627 F.3d at 938-39; In re Martin, 2007 WL 2893431, at *1;
Leary, 251 B.R. at 657-59; Fiorani, 192 B.R. at 403-04; Pastore, 186 B.R. at 554.
291n re Burnett, 635 F.3d at 171; Rea, 627 F.3d at 938-39; In re Martin, 2007 WL 2893431, at *1;
Leary, 251 B.R. at 656-57; Fiorani, 192 B.R. at 403-04, 407-09; Pastore, 186 B.R. at 554.
"There are those who maintain that working as a bank teller requires personal creditworthiness
because tellers have access to and handle customers' money. Landry & Hardy, supra note 10, at 48-49, 59;
Phillips & Schein, supra note 10, at 156. Tellers handle customers' money, but not in the sense that they
make decisions about what a bank does with customers' money. Without trying to demean what tellers do,
the essence of their job involves fairly simple transactions, namely, accepting customers' deposits, handling
their withdrawals, cashing their checks, and the like. Further, tellers do this all under the watchful eye of
security cameras, security personnel, and perhaps most importantly, the customers themselves. Thus, it is
highly unlikely that a bank teller who has filed bankruptcy poses any more of a threat to steal a customer's
money than a bank teller who has an impeccable credit history. Concepci6n, supra note 8, at 539, 545-46
(Vol. 91662
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Bankruptcy debtors are not very sympathetic figures because of the per-
sistent stereotype that they are financial deadbeats who are undeserving of a
break.3' There are certainly financial deadbeats among the cohort of bank-
ruptcy filers, but the idea that the dockets of the bankruptcy courts are
swelled with them is a myth. 3 2 One of the purposes of this Article is to
counter the argument that bankruptcy debtors are fiscal scofflaws who
should find it more difficult to obtain employment because their bankruptcy
status makes them less worthy candidates for employment. The typical bank-
ruptcy filer is not helped by being scorned or ridiculed by those fortunate
enough to have steered clear of financial difficulty. A second purpose of this
Article is to demonstrate that employers should stop refusing to hire a person
because he or she is or was a debtor if personal creditworthiness is not re-
lated to successful performance of the job the person seeks, and the person is
otherwise qualified for the job.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I details the history of
§ 525(a) and § 525(b). Part II discusses how the courts have addressed the
question of whether § 525(b) prohibits private employers from denying em-
ployment to persons who are or have been debtors. Part III addresses how
bankruptcy discrimination implicates the disparate impact doctrine under Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Part IV shows just how many
Americans live in financial peril and attempts to explode the myth that the
reason they do is primarily because of their own irresponsibility.
I. PEREZ V. CAMPBELL SET THE STAGE FOR THE
ENACTMENT OF 11 U.S.C. § 525.
On July 8, 1965, Adolfo Perez ("Mr. Perez") caused an automobile acci-
dent in Tucson, Arizona.33 The minor daughter of Leonard Pinkerton ("Mr.
Pinkerton") drove the second vehicle.34 At the time of the accident, Mr. Pe-
rez did not have liability insurance on his vehicle.35 In September 1966, Mr.
Pinkerton and his wife sued Mr. Perez and his wife in an Arizona state court
for personal injuries and property damage.36 On October 31, 1967, Mr. Perez
and his wife confessed judgment, and on November 8, 1967, the state trial
court entered a judgment against the Perezes in the amount of $2,425.98.37
(arguing that there is no evidence correlating an employee's negative credit history with a propensity to
steal).
3 1
Concepci6n, supra note 8, at 541; Warren, supra note 17, at 1492-1503.
32
Concepci6n, supra note 8, at 541; Warren, supra note 17, at 1492-1503.




"Id. Mr. Perez and Mrs. Perez jointly owned the vehicle Mr. Perez drove. Perez v. Campbell, 421
F.2d 619, 621 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 402 U.S. 637, 656 (1971).
37Perez, 402 U.S. at 638.
2017) 663
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On November 6, 1967, two days before the state trial court entered a
judgment against them, the Perezes filed bankruptcy, and they included in
their list of debts the judgment they confessed to on October 31, 1967. On
July 8, 1968, the Perezes received a discharge that included the $2,425.98
judgment in favor of the Pinkertons.9 At the time, Arizona and forty-four
other states had in effect some version of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act, which was promulgated by the National Conference on
Street and Highway Safety.40 Arizona called its version the Arizona Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act ("Arizona Act").4'
Under Article 4 of the Arizona Act, if a judgment for damages "arising
out of the ownership, maintenance[,] or use of a motor vehicle" remained
unsatisfied for sixty days after its entry, the state court clerk or the state
court judge had to forward a certified copy of the judgment to the Superin-
tendent of the Motor Vehicle Division of the Highway Department ("Super-
intendent").42 Once the Superintendent received a certified copy of a
judgment, he or she had to suspend the driver's license and vehicle registra-
tion of the judgment debtor, and the suspension remained in effect until the
judgment debtor satisfied the judgment and gave proof of financial responsi-
bility for a future period.4* The Arizona Act also provided that "a discharge
in bankruptcy following the rendering of any such judgment shall not relieve
the judgment debtor from any of the requirements of [Article 4]."44
On March 13, 1968, 126 days after the state trial court entered the judg-
ment against the Perezes and 117 days before they received a discharge, the
Superintendent notified the Perezes that their drivers' licenses and vehicle
registrations were suspended.45 The Perezes then filed a complaint in federal
district court claiming, among other things, that the part of the Arizona Act
that conditioned the renewal or issuance of a driver's license and vehicle re-
gistration on the satisfaction of a debt that had been discharged in bank-
ruptcy conflicted with the Bankruptcy Act and violated the Supremacy
381d. at 638-39.
91d. at 639.
0Id. at 665 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Besides Arizona, the other states that had enacted some
version of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act were: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Perez invalidated all of









Clause of the Constitution.46 The district court dismissed the Perezes' com-
plaint, finding that Kesler v. Department of Public Safety Financial Responsi-
bility Division, State of Utah,47 and Reitz v. Mealey,48 had both rejected the
argument that state laws conditioning the issuance or renewal of a driver's
license on satisfying judgments stemming from automobile accidents, even.
when those judgments had been discharged in bankruptcy, conflicted with
the Bankruptcy Act.49 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court on the same grounds.50 The Perezes then
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United
States, asking it to consider the constitutionality of
the power of a State to include as part of [a] comprehensive
enactment designed to secure compensation for automobile
accident victims in a section providing that a discharge in
bankruptcy of the automobile accident or tort judgment shall
have no effect on the judgment debtor's obligation to repay
the judgment creditor, at least insofar as such repayment
may be enforced by the withholding of driving privileges by
the State.51
The Court began its analysis by finding that the Supreme Court of Ari-
zona had construed the Arizona Act to be primarily concerned with protect-
ing persons who use the highways from the financial hardship that might
result from financially irresponsible persons operating motor vehicles on those
highways.52 Next, the Court repeated what it had stated several times
before, namely that "one of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to
give debtors a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, un-
hampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt."53 This
"new opportunity" included the freedom from most preexisting tort judg-
ments.54 The Court then asked "whether a state statute that protects judg-
ment creditors from financially irresponsible persons conflicts with a federal
statute that gives discharged debtors a new start unhampered by the pressure
and discouragement of preexisting debt[?]"5 5
46Id. at 643.
47369 U.S. 153, 173-74 (1962).
48314 U.S. 33, 38-40 (1941).
4 9Perez, 402 U.S. at 643.
sold. at 643-44.
5Id. at 643.
52Id. at 644 (citing Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136, 140 (Ariz. 1963)).
s"Id. at 648 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
54Perez, 402 U.S. at 648 (citing Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S. 467, 468-71 (1925)).
ssPerez, 402 U.S. at 649.
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Relying on Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden,56
which held that acts of the states that interfere with or are contrary to the
laws of Congress are invalid under the Supremacy Clause, and Justice Hugo
Black's majority opinion in Hines v. Davidowitz,57 which concluded that the
Court's function in Supremacy Clause cases is to determine whether a state
statute "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress," the Court held that Kesler and Reitz
"ignored [those] controlling principle[s]."58 The Court then overruled Kesler
and Reitz, and held that the part of the Arizona Act that conditioned the
issuance or renewal of a driver's license and a vehicle registration on the
satisfaction of a judgment stemming from a motor vehicle accident, even if
that judgment had been discharged in bankruptcy, violated the Supremacy
Clause because it frustrated the "full effectiveness" of the Bankruptcy Act,
which was intended to give debtors "a new start unhampered by the pressure
and discouragement of preexisting debt."5 9
A. CONGRESS CODIFIED PEREZ IN THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
OF 1978.
On April 4, 1800, the Sixth Congress enacted the nation's first federal
bankruptcy law.60 The debate surrounding the law was polarized, with com-
mercial interests supporting it and southern and agricultural interests oppos-
ing it.61 Ultimately, the law passed by one vote in the House of
Representatives.62 The 1800 law was a compromise measure, and Congress
intended for it to expire in 1805, however, the Eighth Congress repealed it
on December 19, 1803.63
On August 19, 1841, the Twenty-Seventh Congress passed the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1841.64 The 1841 law differed substantially from the 1800 law
in that it allowed a debtor to file bankruptcy and seek a discharge of his
debts, which was a first in the history of federal bankruptcy law.6 s The 1841
5622 U.S. 1, 211 (1824).
57312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
ssPerez, 402 U.S. at 649-50.
5
9d. at 651-52. The Court described Kesler and Reitz as "aberrational" because they held that state
law could frustrate the operation of federal law so long as the state legislature that enacted the law did not
do so for the purpose of frustrating the operation of federal law. Id.
'Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 Am. BANKR. INST.
L. REv. 5, 6-7, 14-15 (1995). Professor Tabb's article is a thorough history and commentary on bankruptcy
law in England from 1542 to 1732 and in the United States from 1800 to 1994. Id. at 7-12, 12-43.




MId. at 16. Following the 1803 repeal, state legislation filled the gap left by the absence of federal




law displeased creditors because they received paltry dividends and paid high
administrative costs.66 Consequently, the same Congress that enacted the
1841 law repealed it eighteen months later on March 3, 1843.67
On March 2, 1867, the Thirty-Ninth Congress passed the Bankruptcy
Act of 1867.68 This iteration of bankruptcy law differed from its 1841 prede-
cessor in that it included provisions for voluntary and involuntary bankrupt-
cies as well as corporate bankruptcies.69 Creditors objected to the 1867 law
on substantially the same grounds as they did to the 1841 law, namely, low
dividend payouts, high costs, and the lengthy amount of time it took for bank-
ruptcy cases to conclude.70 Again, Congress responded to the critics, and on
June 7, 1878, the Forty-Fifth Congress repealed the 1867 law.71
On July 1, 1898, the Fifty-Fifth Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Act of
1898.72 Professor Charles Jordan Tabb describes the 1898 law as the "begin-
ning of the era of permanent federal bankruptcy legislation."73 The next major
revision to federal bankruptcy law occurred on June 22, 1938, when the Sev-
enty-Fifth Congress passed the Chandler Act, which Professor Tabb argues
"substantially revised [nearly the entire] 1898 law and thoroughly updated
the substantive and procedural law of liquidation cases."74
On November 6, 1978, the Ninety-Fifth Congress enacted the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 197875 in order to modernize and codify the substan-
tive law of bankruptcy and to enact much of the procedural law of
bankruptcy in Title 11 of the United States Code.76 The 1978 law was
Congress's first comprehensive reform of federal bankruptcy law since the
Chandler Act four decades earlier, and it was the first comprehensive reform
that did not result from Congress responding to a severe economic depres-
sion.77 The 1978 law serves as the foundation of modern bankruptcy law.78












7'S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787; H.R. Rep. No. 95-585, at 1
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963. The official name of the law is "An Act To establish a
uniform law on the Subject of Bankruptcies." Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978).
"Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549-2688 (1978); S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 1 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 3-5 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5964-5967.
"Tabb, supra note 60, at 32.
"Id.
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A governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse
to renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar
grant to, condition such a grant to, discriminate with respect
to such a grant against, deny employment to, terminate the
employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment
against, a person that is or has been a debtor under this title
or a bankrupt or a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, or an-
other person with whom such bankrupt or debtor has been
associated, solely because such bankrupt or debtor is or has
been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or debtor under
the Bankruptcy Act, has been insolvent before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or during the case but
before the debtor is granted or denied a discharge, or has not
paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case under this title
or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act.79
Congress enacted § 525 in order to provide additional protection to debt-
ors by codifying the holding in Perez "that a State would frustrate the Con-
gressional policy of a fresh start for a debtor if it were permitted to refuse to
renew a driver[']s license because a tort judgment resulting from an automo-
bile accident had been unpaid as a result of a discharge in bankruptcy."80
Section 525 prohibits governmental units from denying employment to, ter-
minating the employment of, or discriminating with respect to employment
against a person who is or has been a debtor, or who is or has been associated
with a debtor.8' Section 525's anti-discrimination principle applies only to
acts of discrimination that are based solely on the basis of bankruptcy, or on
the basis of insolvency before or during bankruptcy prior to a determination
of discharge, or on the basis of the non-payment of a debt that has been
discharged in bankruptcy.82 It does not ban discrimination based on non-
bankruptcy considerations such as future financial responsibility or ability, so
long as those considerations are applied in a non-discriminatory fashion.83
By specifying prohibited forms of discrimination in § 525, Congress did
not intend to allow other forms.84 Congress contemplated that courts would
7 9Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, Title I, § 525, 92 Stat. 2549, 2593 (1978) (emphases
added).
8S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 81 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5867; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at
366 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6322.
s 11 U.S.C. § 525.82
1d.
IS. Rep. No. 95-989, at 81 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5867; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at
366 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 6322-23.
84S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 81 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5867 ("[T]he section is not ex-
haustive. The enumeration of various forms of discrimination against former bankrupts is not intended to
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continue to develop and refine Perez by prohibiting acts by "governmental or
quasi-governmental units that perform licensing functions, such as a State bar
association or a medical society, or by other organizations that can seriously
affect the debtor[']s livelihood or fresh start, such as exclusion from a union
on the basis of discharge of a debt to the union's credit union."85 Section 525
as originally enacted did not prohibit bankruptcy discrimination by private
parties, which is an omission that Congress intended.86
B. CONGRESS ENACTED 11 U.S.C. § 525(B) IN THE BANKRUPTCY
AMENDMENTS AND FEDERAL JUDGESHIP ACT OF 1984.
In addition to codifying the substantive and procedural law of bank-
ruptcy in Title 11 of the United States Code, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 granted bankruptcy judges jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings arising
under [T]itle 11 or arising in or related to cases under [T]itle 1 1."87 This
jurisdictional grant authorized bankruptcy courts to preside over suits to re-
cover accounts, cases involving exempt property, actions to avoid transfers
and payments as preferences or fraudulent conveyances, and causes of action
owned by the debtor at the time of the petition for bankruptcy.88 The bank-
ruptcy courts could also decide claims based on state law or federal law.89
Unlike Article III judges,90 however, the judges of the bankruptcy courts do
not have life tenure,91 and their salaries can be reduced if Congress chooses to
permit other forms of discrimination."); H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 366 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6323 (same).
8'S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 81 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5867; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at
366 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6323.
"S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 81 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5867 ("This section is not so broad
as a comparable section proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission, H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-508
(1975), [that] would have extended the prohibition to any discrimination, even by private parties.); H.R.
Rep. No. 95-595, at 366 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6323 (same).
57Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, Title II, § 241(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2657, 2668-69 (1978)
(codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1976 & Supp. IV)).
"N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 54 (1982) (plurality opinion).
"
9
Id. at 54 (citing 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 3.01, 3-47 - 3-48 (15th ed. 1982)).
'Article III, § 1 of the Constitution provides: "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 1. The "good Behaviour" Clause has been construed to mean that Article III judges have life tenure,
subject only to removal by impeachment. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 59 (citing United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955)). The "Compensation" Clause has been construed to mean that Article III
judges' salaries cannot be reduced. Id. (citing United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218-21 (1980)).
91Bankruptcy judges were appointed by the President, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.
Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, Title II, § 201(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2657 (1978) (codified as 28
U.S.C. § 152 (1976 & Supp. IV)). The judges served fourteen year terms and could be removed from office
for incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-598, Title II, § 201(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2657-2658 (1978) (codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 153(a), (b)
(1976 & Supp. IV)).
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do so.92
On June 28, 1982, the Supreme Court decided Northern Pipeline Con-
struction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.9 3 The question presented in the case
was whether the broad jurisdictional grant that Congress conferred on bank-
ruptcy courts in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 violated Article III of
the Constitution.94 In a plurality opinion joined by Justices Thurgood Mar-
shall, Harry Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens, Justice William Brennan
wrote that 'Art[icle] III bars Congress from establishing legislative courts to
exercise jurisdiction over all matters related to those arising under the bank-
ruptcy laws."9 5 The plurality concluded that the broad jurisdictional grant
that Congress conferred on bankruptcy courts in the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 "impermissibly removed most, if not all, of 'the essential attributes of
the judicial power' from the Art[icle] III district court, and [ ] vested those
attributes in a non-Art[icle] III adjunct."9 6
On July 10, 1984, the Ninety-Eighth Congress responded to the Mara-
thon decision by enacting the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judge-
ship Act of 1984.97 Although the Ninety-Fifth Congress specifically declined
to ban private parties from engaging in bankruptcy discrimination, the
Ninety-Eighth Congress took a different tack.98 In addition to curing the
constitutional defects in the 1978 law as exposed by the Marathon decision,
the 1984 amendments renumbered 11 U.S.C. § 525 as § 525(a), and added a
new section, § 525(b), which provided as follows:
No private employer may terminate the employment of, or dis-
criminate with respect to employment against, an individual
who is or has been a debtor under this title, a debtor or
bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act, or an individual associ-
ated with such debtor or bankrupt, solely because such
debtor or bankrupt: (1) is or has been a debtor under this
title or a debtor or bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act; (2)
has been insolvent before the commencement of a case under
this title or during the case but before the grant or denial of
a discharge; or (3) has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in
9 2Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, Title II, § 201(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2657-58 (1978) (codified
as 28 U.S.C. § 154 (1976 & Supp. IV)).
9'458 U.S. 50 (1982).
9 4Maratbon, 458 U.S. at 52-53.
9'1d. at 76.
9Id. at 87.
97Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333-392 (1984); H.R. Rep. No. 98-882 (1984) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 576-606.
9 8Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, Title III, § 309,
98 Stat. 333, 352, 354-55 (1984).
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a case under this title or that was discharged under the
Bankruptcy Act.9
Congress enacted § 525(b) in order to extend the anti-discrimination
principle that § 525(a) applied to government employers to private employ-
ers.100 Prior to 1984, private employers were free to terminate a person's
employment based solely on his or her filing bankruptcy.'0 The language of
§ 525(b) mirrors the language of § 525(a) with one significant exception. Sec-
tion 525(a) prohibits a government employer from "deny[ing] employment to,
terminat[ing] the employment of, or discriminat[ing] with respect to employ-
ment against [a debtor]," whereas § 525(b) prohibits a private employer from
"terminat[ing] the employment of, or discriminat[ing] with respect to em-
ployment against [a debtor]."102 The absence of the 'deny employment to"
language in § 525(b) raises the question of whether a private employer can or
should refuse to hire a person because he or she is or was a debtor.10
99Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, Title III, § 309,
98 Stat. 333, 352, 354-55 (1984) (emphasis added). Section 525(b) became effective for cases filed on or
after October 9, 1984. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
Title III, § 553(a), 98 Stat. 333, 352, 392 (1984).
"The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, which
includes § 525(b), consists solely of statements by the following legislators: Representative Peter W.
Rodino, Jr., Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier, Senator Strom Thurmond, Senator Robert J. Dole,
and Senator Orrin G. Hatch. 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 576-78 (Representative Rodino); 579-580 (Representa-
tive Kastenmeier); 581-85 (Senator Thurmond); 586-89 (Senator Dole); 590-606 (Senator Hatch). Neither
the Senate nor the House submitted a report, and the House Conference Report did not contain a joint
explanatory statement. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 576. By way of comparison, the legislative history of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 consists of a 176 page Senate Report, a 549 page House Report, a 70 page
statement by Representative Don Edwards, and a 70 page statement by Senator Dennis DeConcini. 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436-6505 (Representative Edwards); 6505-6573 (Senator DeConcini).
"0Inre Stinson, 285 B.R. at 241 n.5 (citing McLellan v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919, 929-
30 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc)).
'02Compare 11 U.S.C. § 525(a), with 11 U.S.C. § 525(b).
'Douglass G. Boshkoff, Bankruptcy-Based Discrimination, 66 AM. BANKR. LJ. 387, 391-97 (1992)
(courts that read § 525(b) to allow an employer to refuse to hire a debtor "interfere with the rehabilitative
features of bankruptcy law"); Douglass G. Boshkoff, Private Parties and Bankruptcy-Based Discrimination,
62 IND. LJ. 159 174-82 (1987) (even though the text of § 525(b) gives private employers more freedom to
discriminate based on bankruptcy status, private employers should be prohibited from engaging in bank-
ruptcy discrimination just as governmental employers are prohibited); John C. Chobot, Anti-Discrimina-
tion Under the Bankruptcy Laws, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 185, 196-201 (1986) (one can argue persuasively
that Congress intended to narrow the scope of bankruptcy discrimination protection when it omitted the
"deny employment to" language from § 525(b)); Donald C. Dowling, Jr., The Intersection Between U.S.
Bankruptcy and Employment Law, 10 LAB. LAW. 57, 70-72 (1994) ("Overall, [United States] law generally
protects workers at the expense of employers, both in employer bankruptcies and in workers' bankrupt-
cies."); Karyn D. Heavenrich, Student Gallery, Are Fair Employment Practices after Bankruptcy a Human
Right?, 32 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2013, at 36-37 (reading § 525(b) to allow private employers to refuse
to hire a debtor is sound statutory interpretation, but refusing to hire a debtor with no regard for why the
person is or was a debtor and without considering the debtor's non-bankruptcy related qualifications
violates the debtor's human rights); Andrew N. Herbach, Debtor's Protection from Private Employer's Dis-
crimination, 61 Wis. B. BULL., Oct. 1988, at 21-23 (§ 525(b) does not protect an employee from termina-
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tion for non-bankruptcy reasons such as poor job performance, and a person claiming a violation of
§ 525(b) has the burden of proving that the employer acted solely because of the person's bankruptcy
status) (emphasis in original); Michael R. Herz, The Scarlet D: Bankruptcy Filing and Employment Discrim-
ination, 30 AM. BANKR. INsT. J., Apr. 2011, at 16 (courts cannot be faulted for interpreting § 525(b) to
allow private employers to refuse to hire debtors, however, that interpretation frustrates the fresh start
goal of the Bankruptcy Code, thus, Congress should amend § 525(b) to prohibit private sector bankruptcy
discrimination); Robert J. Landry & Benjamin Hardy, Bankrupts Need Not Apply: Sound Hiring Policy or
Dangerous Proposition?, 7 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 47, 51, 57-60 (2012) (employers should be allowed to base
hiring decisions on bankruptcy status because a bankruptcy can be an indicator of an applicant's responsi-
bility, honesty and other "soft skills [that are important to successful job performance . . ., but ]are difficult
to detect in the hiring process"); Jeanette E. McPherson, The Anti-Discrimination Provision Does Not
Apply to Private Employers Who Deny Employment Based Upon Bankruptcy Status, 20 NORTON J. BANKR.
L. & PRAc. 6 Art. 4 (Dec. 2011) (reading § 525(b) to allow private employers to refuse to hire debtors is a
sound application of the "canons of statutory interpretation ... [,h]owever, with the tough economic times
in which we live, and the attendant increase in bankruptcy filings, time will tell whether § 525[(b)] will
continue to be analyzed so strictly without consideration to its overall purpose or if it will be amended by
Congress to protect those who are denied employment due to their bankruptcy status."); Michael D.
Moberly, Contemplating the Recognition of a Common Law Tort for Wrongfully Refusing to Hire Bank-
ruptcy Debtors, 22 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 431, 481-86 (2014) (There is nothing "irrational, unusual, or
objectionable" about Congress's decision to prohibit governmental employers from refusing to hire debtors
while allowing private employers to do just that given the political dynamics of lawmaking. Any expansion
of § 525(b) should come from Congress, not the courts.); Sharon Goott Nissim, Stopping a Vicious Cycle:
The Problems with Credit Checks in Employment and Strategies to Limit Their Use, 18 GEO. J. ON POV-
ERTY L. & PoL'Y 45, 48-49, 70-78 (2010) (Given the disparate racial impact on the use of credit checks -
which will disclose bankruptcies - as employment screening devices, Congress and the states should enact
legislation to prohibit the use of credit checks in the employment application process except ". . . for
positions in which the employee would have access to significant cash or other financial or business assets,
and positions that have access to confidential or secure information."); Samantha Orovitz, Comment, The
Bankruptcy Shadow: Section 525(b) and the job Applicant's Sisyphean Struggle for a Fresh Start, 29 EM-
ORY BANKR. DEv. J. 553, 589-590, 594-600 (2013) (Denying employment to a person because he or she is
or was a debtor is "unreasonable and unnecessarily punitive," therefore, Congress should amend § 525(b)
to prohibit the practice.); James D. Phillips & David D. Schein, Utilizing Credit Reports for Employment
Purposes: A Legal Bait and Switch Tactic?, 18 RiCH. J.L. & PuB. INT. 133, 152-57 (2015) (Private employ-
ers are "rational actors" and would not use screening tools like credit reports if those tools did not result in
hiring better applicants. Also, "employers expect [ ] applicants to pay their bills . . . as this may [indicate
the kind] of ethical behavior [they] will practice [if hired.]"; Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The
Failure of Bankruptcy's Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 67,100-09, 125-28 (2006) (The authors analyzed
data from 2001 to 2003 that was part of "Phase III of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project," which collected
data from debtor questionnaires, public court records, and telephone interviews. The authors concluded
that Chapter 7 bankruptcy does not "ensure lasting financial well-being" for one-third of families that seek
its protection because post-bankruptcy, these families experience a decline in their income often because of
job or medical problems. They also stated that notwithstanding the prohibition on terminating a person
for filing bankruptcy, it happens nevertheless); Lea Shepard, Seeking Solutions to Financial History Dis-
crimination, 46 CONN. L. REv. 993, 1029-30 (2014) (noting that 25% of employers consider bankruptcy
filings in making employment decisions and § 525(b) authorizes private employers to refuse to hire a
person on this basis. She argues that this practice "promotes discrimination."); Lea Shepard, Toward a
Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1695, 1756-61 (2012) (citing a 2008
study stating that 45% of persons who were denied employment after filing bankruptcy reported that the
denial was "attributable to the bankruptcy filing." The author argued that "[b]ankruptcy antidiscrimina'
tion protection is [a necessary, but not sufficient] component of an effective and comprehensive financial
history antidiscrimination norm."); Robert C. Yan, Note: The Sign Says "Help Wanted, Inquire Within" -
But it May Not Matter if Tou Have Ever Filed (or Plan to File) for Bankruptcy, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 429, 457-59, 461-62 (2002) (The correct interpretation of § 525(b) is that it does not reach private
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II. DOES § 525(B) PROHIBIT A PRIVATE EMPLOYER FROM
REFUSING TO HIRE A DEBTOR?
Three United States circuit courts,104 two United States district
courts,0 5 and two United States bankruptcy courts0 6 have held that
§ 525(b) does not prohibit a private employer from refusing to hire a debtor.
Six United States bankruptcy courts have held that § 525(b) is only available
to persons once an employer - employee relationship has formed, and if an
employer refuses to hire a person, that person cannot use § 525(b) because he
or she was never an employee of the employer.'0 7 One United States district
court has held that § 525(b) prohibits private employers from refusing to hire
debtors in the same way that § 525(a) prohibits government employers from
refusing to hire debtors.os Finally, one United States circuit court has sug-
gested that if an employer's sole reason for refusing to hire a person is because
the person is or was a debtor, that employer could be subject to a cause of
action under § 525(b).'0
A. THE MAJORITY VIEW IS THAT § 525(B) DOES NOT APPLY TO
HIRING DECISIONS.
The courts that have held that § 525(b) does not apply to hiring deci-
sions reached that conclusion using established canons of statutory interpre-
tation."r0 As previously noted, § 525(a) prohibits government employers
sector discrimination based on bankruptcy status. Such a reading frustrates the fresh start principle of the
Bankruptcy Code, but if § 525(b) is to be changed in a manner consonant with this principle, Congress is
the proper body to make that change.); Jina Kim Yun, Note, The New Danger of Being Fired: Section
525(b)'s Disproportionate Effect on Older Workers and a Call to Amend, 7 Nw. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 196,
196-99, 216-18 (2012) (The absence of the "deny employment to" language in § 525(b) has had an "overly
punitive" impact on debtors, particularly older ones. The remedy for this impact, however, should be
legislative rather than judicial.); David L. Zeiler, Section 525(b): Anti-Discrimination Protection for Em-
ployees/Debtors in the Private Sector - Is it Illusion or Reality?, 101 COM. LJ. 152, 163-176 (1996) (When
Congress enacted § 525 in 1978, it announced a broad antidiscrimination principle. Congress recognized
courts' authority to more specifically define the "contours" of this principle and invited them to do so.
When Congress enacted § 525(b) in 1984, however, most courts declined that invitation and interpreted
the section narrowly, which frustrated the fresh start principle of the Bankruptcy Code and thereby
rendered § 525(b)'s protection illusory.)
"o'Myers, 640 F.3d at 1283-87; In re Burnett, 635 F.3d at 171-74; Rea, 627 F.3d at 940-41.
0 5Fiorani, 192 BR. at 404-07; Pastore, 186 BR. at 554-55.
'"In re Martin, 2007 WL 2893431, at *1-5; In re Stinson, 285 BR. at 241-50.
o7In re Hardy, 209 B.R. 371, 374-79 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997); In re Bobbitt, 174 B.R. 548, 552 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 1993); In re Briggs, 143 BR. 438, 443-45 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992); In re Henry, 129 B.R. 75, 78
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991); In re Spaulding, 116 B.R. at 569, 571-73; In re Hopkins, 81 B.R. 491, 494 (Bankr.
W.D. Ark. 1987); In re Madison Madison Int'l of Ill., P.C., 77 B.R. at 680-82).
'0 Leary, 251 BR. at 658-59.
'oComeaux, 915 F.2d at 1268-69.
"oMyers, 640 F.3d at 1280-87; In re Burnett, 635 F.3d at 171-74; Rea, 627 F.3d at 938-41; Fiorani,
192 BR. at 404-07; Pastore, 186 B.R. at 554-55; In re Martin, 2007 WL 2893431, at *1-5; In re Stinson,
285 B.R at 241-50.
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from denying employment to, terminating the employment of, or discriminat-
ing with respect to employment against a person who is or has been a debtor,
or who is or has been associated with a debtor,"' while § 525(b) prohibits
private employers from terminating the employment of, or discriminating
with respect to employment against a person who is or has been a debtor, or
who is or has been associated with a debtor.112 The prohibitions in both
sections are the same, except § 525(b) does not include the phrase "deny
employment to."
The Supreme Court has said on multiple occasions, "[w]hen Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute, but omits it in another
section of the same statute, it is generally presumed that Congress intention-
ally omitted the language in the other section."13 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit relied on this canon of construction in
Myers v. Toojay's Management. Corp., when it held that Congress deliber-
ately omitted the "deny employment to" language from § 525(b).114 Myers
went on to state that if Congress wanted to prohibit private employers from
denying employment to debtors, it would have done so in the same way that
it prohibited government employers from denying employment to debtors.x"5
The Supreme Court has also said on multiple occasions that "[w]hen
identical words and phrases appear in the same statute, those words and
phrases should be given the same meaning,"6 and a statute should be inter-
preted to give effect to all of its provisions so that no part of it is rendered
superfluous."7 The phrase "discriminate with respect to employment" ap-
pears in both § 525(a) and in § 525(b). Because § 525(a) also prohibits gov-
ernment employers from "deny[ing] employment to" debtors, some courts
have relied on this canon of construction to hold that the phrase "discrimi-
nate with respect to employment" cannot encompass hiring decisions because
such an interpretation would render the phrase "deny employment to" in
§ 525(a) superfluous.118 In these courts' view, if the phrase "discriminate
with respect to employment" in § 525(a) cannot encompass hiring decisions,
11111 U.S.C. § 525(a).
11211 U.S.C. § 525(b).
...Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 573 (2009); Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 528-29
(2003); Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2002); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23
(1983).
114640 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
1151d.
"'Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1720 (2017); Powerex Corp. v. Reliant
Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007); IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005); Sullivan v.
Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990).
1x7Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1352 (2015); Corley v. United States, 556 U.S.
303, 314 (2009); TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174
(2001).
"'sMyers, 640 F.3d at 1285; In re Burnett, 635 F.3d at 172-73; Fiorani, 192 B.R. at 404-05.
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then the identical phrase in § 525(b) has to have the identical meaning.'19
These courts also held that if the phrase "discriminate with respect to em-
ployment" in § 525(a) is broad enough to encompasses hiring decisions, it
would encompass termination decisions, and if that is true, then the phrase
"terminate the employment of' in § 525(a) and in § 525(b) would be super-
fluous.1 20 These courts interpret the phrase "discriminate with respect to
employment" in § 525(a) and § 525(b) as covering aspects of employment
other than hiring and termination, such as the terms, conditions, and privi-
leges of employment, and in these courts' opinion, the phrase has the same
meaning in § 525(a) that it has in § 525(b).121
The purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to give debtors a fresh start.122
Nonetheless, courts that consider private sector bankruptcy discrimination to
be beyond the ambit of § 525(b) do so because in their view, the plain text of
the statute mandates that interpretation, and courts are required to interpret
and apply statutes according to their terms, not according to congressional
purposes.12 3
B. THE MINORITY VIEW IS THAT 525(B) DOES APPLY TO HIRING
DECISIONS.
The one court that has held that § 525(b) does apply to hiring decisions
did so based on the fresh start promise of the Bankruptcy Code.124 In Leary v.
Warnaco, Inc., the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that although § 525(b) does not contain the "deny employ-
ment to" language that § 525(a) does, it would be absurd to read § 525(b) to
allow private employers to refuse to hire debtors seeking to obtain the fresh
start that bankruptcy is intended to afford, while prohibiting those same em-
ployers from discriminating against debtors who have already been hired.125.
Leary further added that the "discriminate with respect to employment"
language in § 525(b) is capacious enough to cover hiring decisions because
the phrase "discriminate with respect to employment" means all aspects of
the employment relationship, including, hiring, termination, and the terms
and conditions of employment.126 Leary concluded that the "evil" that
§ 525(b) is intended to address is no different when an employer terminates
"'Myers, 640 F.3d at 1285-86; In re Burnett, 635 F.3d at 172-73; Fiorani, 192 BR. at 404-05.
1
20Myers, 640 F.3d at 1285-86; In re Burnett, 635 F.3d at 172-73; Fiorani, 192 BR. at 404-05.
121Myers, 640 F.3d at 1285-86; In re Burnett, 635 F.3d at 172-73; Fiorani, 192 BR. at 404-05.
122Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007).
123Myers, 640 F.3d at 1286; Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc., 431 B.R. 894, 899-901 (S.D. Tex. 2010),
affd, 635 F.3d 169, 171-74 (5th Cir. 2011); Fiorani, 192 B.R. at 405-07; In re Madison Madison, Int'l of
Ill., P.C., 77 B.R. at 680-82.
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the employment of a debtor as contrasted with refusing to hire a debtor in
the first instance; in either case, the fresh start purpose of bankruptcy is
thwarted.127 Finally, Leary concluded that § 525(b) does not contain the
phrase "deny employment to" because "the scrivener was more verbose in
writing § 525(a) than it was in writing § 525(b)."l 28
In terms of fulfilling the fresh start principle of the Bankruptcy Code,
Leary's interpretation of § 525(b) makes sense. In terms of applying estab-
lished canons of statutory interpretation, however, the majority has the bet-
ter of the argument.129 Additionally, Congress amended § 525 on October
22, 1994,130 and again on April 20, 2005,11' and in neither instance, did it
add the phrase "deny employment to" to § 525(b). The Supreme Court has
held that when courts reach a consensus on the meaning of a statute and
Congress amends the statute without changing the relevant provision, this
can be taken as persuasive evidence that Congress accepts the courts' inter-
pretation.132 Finally, another court has observed that it is not unusual that





For every canon employed to reach one conclusion, another canon can be employed to reach a
different conclusion. In re Stinson, 285 BR. at 248 n.1 1. For example, the canon that a statute cannot be
applied beyond its text can be countered with the canon that to effect its purpose, a statute may be
implemented beyond its text. Id. (citing Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950)).
"The canon that statutes in pari materia must be construed together is subject to the exception that
statutes are not in pari materia if the scope and aim are distinct or where the design to depart from the
general purpose or policy of the previous statute is apparent. The canon that if language is plain and
unambiguous it must be given effect is countered by the desire to avoid literal interpretations if doing so
leads to absurd results or thwarts the manifest purpose of the statute." In re Stinson, 285 B.R. at 248 n.11.
'Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-394, Title III, § 313, 108 Stat. 4106, 4131, 4140-41
(1994)).
"'Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, Title XII,
§ 1211, 119 Stat. 23, 26, 192, 194 (2005).
"
2
Manhattan Props., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U.S. 320, 336 (1934) (stating that where the lower
federal courts had reached a consensus interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act and Congress had amended
the Act seven times without changing the relevant provision, this is persuasive evidence that Congress
deemed the lower federal courts' interpretation of the Act acceptable). Judge Abner J. Mikva has a very
different view of the doctrine of legislative acquiescence in judicial interpretation of statutes. See generally
Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 627, 630 (1987). According to Judge
Mikva, more than 40% of the members of Congress are lawyers, and most of them have practiced law, but
when they take their oath of office, they stop reading advance sheets, law reviews, and trade journals. Id.
at 630. He also says that the members do not closely follow cases directly involving or interpreting
statutes they have sponsored or in which they have an interest, and neither do the staff attorneys. Id. In
Judge Mikva's view, if judicial review of statutes is to be meaningful and the primacy of Congress is to be
maintained, there must be an increased awareness of what happens to a statute in the courts and in the
agencies, and Congress must know what the courts treat as significant legislative history and how it is
created. Id. Justice Stephen J. Markman of the Michigan Supreme Court shares Judge's Mikva's view and
added, "[e]ven if Members of Congress were aware of all such cases, no sensible theory of statutory
interpretation would require Congress to devote a substantial portion of its time to extinguishing judicial
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restrain private employers because the dynamics of the political decision mak-
ing process differ when it comes to restricting the prerogatives of government
employers versus private employers, namely, private employers probably have
more effective and well-funded lobbyists to advocate against potential new
causes of action against them than do governmental employers.133 In light of
these principles, the fairest reading of § 525(b) is that it does not prohibit
private employers from denying employment to persons who are or have been
debtors.
III. BANKRUPTCY DISCRIMINATION MAY VIOLATE TITLE
VII'S DISPARATE IMPACT PROHIBITION.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964134 prohibits employment dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.3 5 The
law prohibits intentional discrimination, which is known as disparate treat-
ment, as well disparate impact, which describes employment practices that
are not intentionally discriminatory, but nevertheless have a disproportion-
ately adverse effect on persons because of their race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.'3 6 In Title VII's original form, employers could only be found
liable for disparate treatment.3 7 Disparate treatment occurs when an em-
ployer intentionally "treat[s] [a] person less favorably than others because of
[race, color, religion, sex, or national origin]."' 3 8 A disparate treatment plain-
tiff bears the burden of proving the defendant intentionally discriminated
against him or her on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 3 9
In its first iteration, Title VII did not include an express prohibition on
policies or practices that produce a disparate impact, but in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., the Supreme Court interpreted the law to prohibit facially neutral
practices that operate in a discriminatory fashion.140 Griggs held that if an
employment practice operates to exclude persons based on their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, and the practice is not related to successful
forest fires." Stephen J. Markman, On Interpretation and Non-Interpretation, 3 BENCHMARK, 219, 226 n.60
(1987).
"(In re Martin), 2007 WL 2893431, at *2 n.10. For example, on August 31, 2007, Kansas Governor
Kathleen Sebelius announced that all state agencies falling under the executive branch were barred from
engaging in sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination, however, this mandate did not apply to
private actors. Id. (citation omitted).
13442 U.S.C. § 2000e - 2000e-17.
13s42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (2).
'"6Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009).
'3"Id. at 577 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
"'3 Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985-86 (1988)).
'91d. (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 986).
14oGriggs v. Duke Power, Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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job performance, the practice is prohibited.141 If, however, an employer dem-
onstrates that the discriminatory practice is related to successful job perform-
ance, the employer can continue to use the practice, unless a person
challenging the practice can demonstrate that a legitimate alternative practice
exists that is less discriminatory.142
On November 21, 1991, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
which among other things, codified Griggs.143 Under the Civil Rights Act of
1991, a plaintiff has to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact by
demonstrating that an employer uses "a particular employment practice that
causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."144 If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer can de-
fend itself by demonstrating that the practice is "job related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity."s45 Even if, however, the
employer proves job relatedness and business necessity, a plaintiff may still
prevail by demonstrating that the employer refused to adopt an available
alternative employment practice that has a less disparate impact and that
serves its legitimate needs.146
Because blacks and Latinos are overrepresented among bankruptcy filers,
they are probably disproportionately impacted by employers' refusal to hire
debtors.147 Many, but certainly not all, commentators agree with this pre-
mise.148 There are no published-or unpublished for that matter-judicial
14 1Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-35.
142Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
"'Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 1, 3, Title I, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75
(1991) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(kX1)(A), (B), (C), 2000e-2(kX2), (3)).
14442 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(kX)(A)(i).
14542 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
"-42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1XA)(ii); 2000e-2(k)(1)(C).
14
7Concepci6n, supra note 8, at 526, 529-541; Earle, Madek & Missirian, supra note 8, at 161-72;
Karpa, supra note 8, at 86-90; Klein, Moore & Moss, supra note 8, at *1-6; Landry & Hardy, supra note
10, at 54-56; Shepard, supra note 8, at 1010-13, 1041-44.
'48Concepci6n, supra note 8, at 526, 529-41 (According to a 2004 study by the Society of Human
Resource Management, in 2003, 35% of employers used credit checks as an employment screening device.
A credit check will disclose a bankruptcy. A 2000 study by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora-
tion found that 27% of whites had a poor credit rating, while 48% of blacks and 34% of Latinos had a poor
credit rating. Since 1972, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has issued a number of deci-
sions finding that the use of credit scores as an employment screening device has a disparate impact on
racial minorities); Earle, Madek & Missirian, supra note 8, at 161-72; Karpa, supra note 8, at 86-90 (Be-
cause of lending discrimination known as "redlining," "blacks and Latinos have higher unemployment rates
and less favorable credit scores," and as a consequence, they are more adversely impacted by the use of
credit checks as an employment screening device"); Klein, Moore & Moss, supra note 8, at *1-6 (There is a
strong correlation between race and credit scores. Blacks have poor credit at a rate that is 21% higher than
whites, and blacks file bankruptcy at disproportionate rates); Landry & Hardy, supra note 10, at 54-60
("Using bankruptcy status as a proxy for [ ] hiring decisions may give rise to disparate impact claims
[under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.] The [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission]
expressly recommends [that employers abstain from using bankruptcy status as a pre-employment screen-
ing device unless bankruptcy status is] essential to the position." Ultimately, however, the authors con-
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decisions that address the question of whether private employers' refusal to
hire debtors has a disparate impact on blacks and Latinos. There are, how-
ever, two high profile cases that the Equal Opportunity Employment Com-
mission ("EEOC")14 9 filed where the agency claimed that employers' use of
credit history checks violated Title VII's prohibition on disparate impact.150
The EEOC lost both cases in spectacular fashion, and neither loss had any-
thing to do the merits of the disparate impact claims.' 5 '
In EEOC v. Freeman and EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Education Corp., the
EEOC challenged two private employers' use of credit history checks in
screening employment applicants.15 2 In both cases, the EEOC used Kevin
Murphy ("Dr. Murphy"), an industrial and organizational psychologist to
produce statistical data showing that the employers' use of credit history
checks had an unlawful disparate impact on black applicants.'53 In both cases,
the trial courts deemed Dr. Murphy's report and testimony so unreliable that
the courts excluded both and granted the employers' motions for summary
judgment.1s4 The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits not only affirmed the district courts' summary judgment orders, both
courts chastised the EEOC for its litigation strategy, particularly its use of
Dr. Murphy.'ss
At least two reasons might explain why there is no reported litigation on
clude that employers should be allowed to use bankruptcy status in making employment decisions);
Shepard, supra note 8, at 1010-13, 1041-44 (racial minorities are more likely than whites to have low
credit scores and are more likely to suffer the adverse effects of the use of credit scores in employment
screening). But see Phillips & Schein, supra note 10, at 156 (CWhile often alleged by opponents of the use
of credit reports, the anecdotal evidence suggests that minorities are not necessarily disadvantaged by the
use of credit reports.").
149The EEOC is "responsib[le] for developing and implementing agreements, policies[,] and practices
designed to maximize effort, promote efficiency, and eliminate conflict, competition, duplication[,] and
inconsistency among the operations, functions[,] and jurisdictions of the various departments, agencies[,]
and branches of the Federal Government responsible for the implementation and enforcement of equal
employment opportunity legislation, orders, and policies." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14.
1soEEOC v. Freeman, 778 F.3d 463, 464-68 (4th Cir. 2015); EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 748
F.3d 749, 750-54 (6th Cir. 2014). In Parker v. CB Richard Ellis Hawaii, Inc., the district court dismissed
the plaintiffs claim that the employer's use of credit history checks caused an unlawful disparate impact on
blacks because it found that personal creditworthiness was related to the responsibilities of the job of
associate accountant, which is the job the plaintiff sought. No. CV 09-00574 DAE LEK, 2010 WL
5388362, at *9-11 (D. Haw. Dec. 21, 2010). The plaintiff also admitted that he did not have any statistical
evidence that the employer's use of credit history checks caused a disparate impact based on race. Parker,
2010 WL 5388362, at *11. Likewise, in Freeman v. Atlantic Refining & Marketing, Corp., the district
court dismissed the plaintiffs claim that the employer's use of credit reports caused a disparate impact
based on race because the plaintiff admitted that he had no statistical evidence of disparate impact. No. 92-
7029, 1994 WL 156723, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 1994).
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the issue of private employers' refusal to hire debtors causing a disparate
impact based on race. First, a person cannot successfully argue that an em-
ployment practice causes a disparate impact based on his or her case alone
because disparate impact requires proof that the challenged employment prac-
tice discriminates against a group based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
original, not just on an individual.156 That means a single plaintiff cannot
succeed unless he or she can amass statistics that demonstrate that not only
was he or she excluded, but others similarly situated were excluded because
of the same employment practice.57 Although employers that are covered by
Title VIIiS are required to maintain records that disclose the impact their
selection procedures have on the employment opportunities of persons by
race, sex, or ethnic group,159 it is expensive to obtain this information and
have it analyzed by a person with the requisite expertise to pass judicial
muster. There are not a lot of plaintiffs with the financial wherewithal to
fund disparate impact litigation, and there are not a lot of lawyers who can
afford to fund these cases themselves on the chance that they will result in a
large enough recovery that the lawyer can recoup the costs he or she ad-
vanced. A second possible reason why there is no reported litigation on the
issue of private employers' refusal to hire debtors causing a disparate impact
based on race is judicial solicitude towards employers in discrimination cases.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio,160 the federal judiciary has been quite deferential towards employers
when it comes to evaluating the legitimacy of their justifications for their
employment practices.161 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
15642 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(AXi), (ii); 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D).
'"Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 993-1000 (1988).
15An "employer" covered by Title VII means "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). This definition
excludes: "(1) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an
Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of
the competitive service (as defined in section 2102 of Title 5), or (2) a bona fide private membership club
(other than a labor organization) [that] is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of Title 26." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
15929 C.F.R. §§ 1607.4(A), (B).
160490 U.S. 642, 645-661 (1989).
'In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress said Wards Cove "weakened the scope and effectiveness
of civil rights protections[,] and legislation [was] necessary to provide additional protections against un-
lawful discrimination in employment." Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 2(2), 2(3), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). One of
the purposes of the 1991 law was "to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the
scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination."
Id. at § 3(4); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal
Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 103, 104-05, 109-15, 127-32 (2009) (An empirical
study of employment discrimination cases litigated in federal court between 1979 and 2006 led the authors
to conclude that "federal courts disfavor employment discrimination plaintiffs," and would-be-plaintiffs file
fewer cases because of the "fear of judicial bias at the district court level and the appellate court level."
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Circuit often says in employment discrimination cases that "courts do not sit
as super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the busi-
ness judgments made by employers."1 62
From the publicly available data, no court has been presented with the
question of whether employers' refusal to hire debtors causes a disparate im-
pact based on race. On the related issue of the use of credit history checks
more broadly, the EEOC botched Freeman and Parker. Thus, one will have to
wait for another day to see how a court will rule in a case that squarely
presents the question of whether bankruptcy discrimination causes a dispa-
rate impact based on race, national origin, or both.
IV. MOST AMERICANS EXIST IN A STATE OF FINANCIAL
PERIL AND OVERSPENDING HAS LITTLE TO DO WITH
IT.
There is a view that debtors are irresponsible, dishonest, have poor judg-
ment, poor management skills, or both, or that they are more susceptible to
illicit temptation because of financial pressure, therefore, "bankruptcy status
[is] a valuable screening tool in some hiring contexts.".63 One cannot help
but wonder whether this view is partially predicated on the notion that op-
portunities for advancement should be reserved for those who have been vir-
The study showed that "[employment discrimination] cases [end] less favorably for plaintiffs than other
kinds of cases, [and] [p]laintiffs who appeal their losses or [have to defend their victories on appeal] fare
remarkably poorly in the circuit courts." Between 1979 and 2006, employment discrimination plaintiffs
prevailed in 15% of cases, plaintiffs in other kind of cases prevailed in 51% of cases, and "appellate courts
reversed plaintiffs' wins far more often than defendants' wins.")
16 2Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 781 (8th Cir. 1995). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit takes a different approach. In White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., the Sixth
Circuit stated:
Contrary to what Judge Gilman maintains, our Circuit has never adopted a "busi-
ness-judgment rule" which requires us to defer to the employer's "reasonable busi-
ness judgment" in Title VII cases. Indeed, in most Title VII cases the very issue in
dispute is whether the employer's adverse employment decision resulted from an
objectively unreasonable business judgment, i.e., a judgment that was based upon an
impermissible consideration such as the adversely-affected employee's race, gender,
religion, or national origin. In determining whether the plaintiff has produced
enough evidence to cast doubt upon the employer's explanation for its decision, we
cannot, as Judge Gilman does, unquestionably accept the employer's own self-serv-
ing claim that the decision resulted from an exercise of "reasonable business judg-
ment." Nor can we decide "as a matter of law" that "an employer's proffered
justification is reasonable." The question of whether the employer's judgment was
reasonable or was instead motivated by improper considerations is for the jury to
consider. Our role is merely to assess whether the plaintiff has presented enough
evidence for a reasonable jury to accept the plaintiffs claim that the employer made
an unlawful business decision.
533 F.3d 381, 393 n.6 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
'63Landry & Hardy, supra note 10, at 57-60; Phillips & Schein, supra note 10, at 152-57.
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tuous, and one sign of virtue is a pristine financial record. According to this
view, those who have spotty financial records have not been sufficiently vir-
tuous, therefore, they should not be heard to complain about being denied
employment opportunities because those are the just deserts for persons who
are undeserving in the first place. Professor Michael Sandel described this
attitude as "the smug assumption that .. .success is the crown of virtue," and
that those who are on the top of the social, educational, political, or economic
hierarchy are on top because they are more deserving than those below.164
Commenting on this kind of thinking in the context of admission to highly
selective colleges and universities, Professor Randall Kennedy has written,
[m]any of the traits we most admire - intelligence, knowl-
edge, creativity, insight - are not solely, often not even
mainly, the fruit of our own effort[,] but are instead off-
shoots of circumstances beyond one's control: inborn genius,
health, caring parents, attentive teachers, a decent neighbor-
hood. That is why discussions of university admissions and
similar mechanisms of allocation need to be scrubbed clean of
the excessively self-congratulatory individualism in which
they tend to be steeped.165
Putting philosophical quarrels aside for a moment, there is some empirical
data that undermines the premise that an adverse inference about a person's
character or fitness as an employee is merited simply because the person is or
has been a debtor.166
In 2004, Professor Elizabeth Warren published an article entitled, The
Economics of Race: When Making It to the Middle Is Not Enough, in which
she discussed her and her colleagues' findings from the 2001 Consumer Bank-
ruptcy Project ("CBP").' 67 According to Professor Warren, in 1981 when
she and her colleagues started their first study of families that had filed bank-
164
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT'S THE RIGHT THING To Do? 178 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux
2009); RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE LAW 112-13
(Pantheon Books 2013).
"'sKennedy, supra note 163, at 113.
"Atkinson, supra note 15, at 1059-60 (discussing a 2011 settlement between the United States
Department of Justice ("DOJ") and Countrywide Financial Corporation over the bank's racially discrimi-
natory lending practices; a 2012 settlement between the DOJ and Sun Trust Mortgage over the lender's
racially discriminatory lending practices; a 2012 settlement between the DOJ and Wells Fargo over the
banks' racially discriminatory lending practices; and a 2013 settlement between the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, the DOJ, and PNC Bank over the bank's racially discriminatory lending practices);
Warren, supra note 15, at 1780-81 (discussing the 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, which showed
racial disparities in bankruptcy filings and that "90% of bankruptcy filers either attended college, had a job
in the upper 80% of all occupations in the United States, or owned a home, 67% met two of these criteria,
and nearly 30% met all three.")
16
Warren, supra note 15, at 1777-99.
682 (Vol. 91
REFUSING TO HIRE
ruptcy, they expected to find debtors who were marginally employed if at all,
poorly educated, and facing a bleak financial future.168 Their predictions
about their subjects' financial situation was not far off the mark, as their 1981
study showed that "approximately 25% of the families filing for bankruptcy
had incomes below the poverty line, and 50% had incomes between the pov-
erty line and the national median income."'69
By the time of the publication of the CBP in 2001, however, things had
changed dramatically.170 The GBP showed that '90% of debtors either at-
tended college, had a job in the upper 80% of all occupations in the United
States, or owned a home; 67% fit into two of these categories; and nearly
30% fit into all three."171 This led Professor172 Warren to describe the bank-
ruptcy courts as
[places] where middle class families in extraordinary distress
seek relief . . . Bankruptcy is a middle class phenomenon, a
place of escape for those who have good jobs, established
credit, accumulated assets, and [who] have suffered sharp re-
versals. . . Those in bankruptcy are disproportionately mid-
dle class when measured by education, occupation, and home
ownership.73
Warren further noted that the CBP showed that "68.3% of all bank-
ruptcy filings resulted from job layoffs, job cutbacks, salary cuts, or business
failings."174 "Medical problems and medical debts accounted for 51% of fil-
ings, and divorce or the death of a spouse accounted for 20% of filings."' 7 s
All told, "job difficulties, medical issues, and ivorce played a role in 90% of
bankruptcy filings according to the CBP."176 The CBP also revealed that
there is a racial dimension to who files bankruptcy.177 "Black families filed at
the rate of 29.6 filings per 1,000 households; Latino families filed at the rate
of 17.1 filings per 1,000 households; and white families filed at the rate of 9.3
filings per 1,000 households, meaning black families are more than three times






1n 2012, Professor Elizabeth Warren became United States Senator Elizabeth Warren, representing
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress 1774 - Pre-
sent, http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch.asp (last visited July 26, 2017).
17'Warren, supra note 15, at 1799.
1741d. at 1777, 1784.
17'Id. at 1784.
' 76Id. at 1777, 1784.
177Warren, supra note 15, at 1777, 1786.
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twice as likely to file bankruptcy as white families."' 7s
Professor Warren's Economics of Race article demonstrates that most of
those who seek bankruptcy protection are middle class, regardless of race,
but middle class blacks and Latinos exist under far more financial risk than do
middle class whites.'79 For example, Warren contends that home ownership
is widely considered a hallmark of middle class financial stability.80 Analyz-
ing data from 2001, she found that "67.7% of Americans owned their homes,
and those homes had an average value of $122,000."181 That data, however,
showed marked racial disparities in home ownership rates and home val-
ues.182 It showed that "whites owned homes at a rate of 74.3%; blacks owned
homes at a rate of 47.7%; and Latinos owned homes at a rate of 47.3%."183 It
also revealed that "white homeowners' homes had a median value of
$130,000, while the median value of the homes owned by non-white persons
was $92,000."184
Owning a home is typically associated with middle class financial stabil-
ity, but being a homeowner does not immunize one from the kind of fiscal
distress that can lead to a bankruptcy filing, and here too, the CBP showed
racial disparities among homeowners who filed bankruptcy.185 The data
demonstrated that "black homeowners file bankruptcy at the rate of 31.7 per
1,000 homeowners; Latinos file at the rate of 16.4 per 1,000 homeowners;
and whites file at the rate of 6.1 per 1,000 homeowners."186 Stated another
way, "black homeowners file at a rate that is more than five times higher than
the rate at which white homeowners file, and Latino homeowners file at a
rate that is more than three times higher than the rate at which white home-
owners file."' 87 One reason why black and Latino homeowners exist in a
more perilous financial state than their white counterparts is racially discrimi-
natory lending practices in credit and housing transactions.'88
On April 11, 1968, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"),
which makes it unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of housing be-




80 d. at 1787-89.
8 'Id. at 1788.
182Id.





"sAtkinson, supra note 15, at 1059-60; Warren, supra note 15, at 1792-98.
18942 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)-(e); Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title VIII, §§ 801-819, Title IX, § 901, 82 Stat. 73,




tober 28, 1974, Congress enacted the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
("ECOA"), which makes it unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against
any applicant for credit on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin,
sex, marital status, or age.190 Notwithstanding the FHA and the ECOA,
blacks and Latinos have been disproportionately subjected to discrimination
in credit and housing transactions.191
In 2015, Professor Abbye Atkinson published an article entitled Modify-
ing Mortgage Discrimination in Consumer Bankruptcy, in which she discussed
a number of cases filed by the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ")
against various entities for engaging in racially discriminatory consumer lend-
ing.192 In one such case, the DOJ sued Countrywide Financial Corporation,
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., and Countrywide Bank ("Countrywide") on
December 21, 2011, which at that point was the largest fair lending lawsuit
the DOJ ever filed.193
The DOJ's complaint alleged "that between 2004 and 2008, Country-
wide discriminated by charging more than 200,000 [Latino] and [black] bor-
rowers in more than 180 geographic markets in 41 states and the District of
Columbia higher fees and rates than non-Hispanic White borrowers because
of their race or national origin rather than the borrowers' creditworthiness or
other objective criteria related to borrower risk."194 The DOJ also asserted
that "Countrywide [ ] discriminated by steering more than 10,000 [Latino]
and [black] borrowers into subprime mortgages when non-Hispanic White
borrowers with similar credit profiles received prime loans."'9s On June 22,
2015, Countrywide paid $335 million to settle the case.196
"15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1); Pub. L. No. 93-495, Title VII, §§ 701-737, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521-1525
(1974); Atkinson, supra note 15, at 1060. The entire Equal Credit Opportunity Act is codified as 15
U.S.C. §§ 1691 - 1691f.
9'xAtkinson, supra note 15, at 1059-60; Warren, supra note 15, at 1792-98.
" 2 Atkinson, supta note 15, at 1059-61.
19Id. at 1059; Complaint Overview in United States v. Countrywide Financial Corporation, et al.
(C.D. Cal.), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/04/11/countrywide-complaint
.overview.pdf (last visited May 10, 2016); Complaint - United States v. Countrywide Financial Corpora-
tion, et al. (C.D. Cal.), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/2 1 country
widecomp.pdf (last visited May 10, 2016).
"4 Atkinson, supra note 15, at 1059; Complaint Overview in United States v. Countrywide Financial
Corporation, et al. (C.D. Cal.), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/04/11/coun
trywidescomplaintoverview.pdf (last visited May 10, 2016); Complaint - United States v. Countrywide
Financial Corporation, et al. (C.D. Cal.), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/
21/countrywidecomp.pdf (last visited May 10, 2016).
"9 sAtkinson, supra note 15, at 1059; Complaint Overview in United States v. Countrywide Financial
Corporation, et al. (C.D. Cal.), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/04/11/coun
trywidescomplaint-overview.pdf (last visited May 10, 2016); Complaint - United States v. Countrywide
Financial Corporation, et al. (C.D. Cal.), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/
21/countrywidecomp.pdf (last visited May 10, 2016).
x"Atkinson, supra note 15, at 1059; DOJ/Countrywide Settlement Information - USAO-CDCA -
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The next case Professor Atkinson discussed involved a May 31, 2012
consent order between the DOJ and SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. ("SunTrust")
to settle a case the DOJ filed alleging that SunTrust "engaged in a pattern or
practice of discrimination that increased loan prices for many of the qualified
[black] and [Latino] borrowers who obtained loans between 2005 and
2009."197 The DOJ also alleged "that SunTrust routinely charged black and
Latino borrowers higher discretionary broker fees and retail loan markup
fees."198 SunTrust paid $21 million to settle the case.199
Professor Atkinson then turned to a case the DOJ filed on July 12, 2012
against Wells Fargo, which at that point was the DOJ's second largest fair
lending lawsuit ever.200 The DOJ alleged that "Wells Fargo steered black and
Latino homebuyers into expensive mortgages and charged them excessive
fees."201 Wells Fargo paid $175 million to settle the case.202
Finally, Professor Atkinson discussed a January 9, 2014 settlement be-
tween the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau of the United States
("CFPB") and National City Bank, which was a lending discrimination law-
suit where the CFPB alleged that "National City Bank had policies and prac-
tices in place that resulted in black and Latino borrowers paying higher
interest rates, fees, and other costs than similarly situated white borrowers,
and that those higher rates, fees, and costs could not be fully explained by
factors other than race and national origin."203 National City Bank paid $35
million to settle the case.204
Professor Atkinson's article also highlighted the disparate racial impact of
the 2008 housing market collapse and recession.205 At the apex of the sub-
Department of Justice, bttps://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/dojcountrywide-settlement-information (last
visited May 10, 2016).
'
97
Atkinson, supra note 15, at 1059; Justice Department Reaches $21 Million Settlement to Resolve
Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Suntrust Mortgage - OPA - Department of Justice, bttps://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-21-million-settlement-resolve-allegationslending-dis
crimination (last visited May 10, 2016).
19'Atkinson, supra note 15, at 1059; Justice Department Reaches $21 Million Settlement to Resolve
Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Suntrust Mortgage - OPA - Department of Justice, https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-2 1 million-settlement-resolve-allegations-lendingdis
crimination (last visited May 10, 2016).
"9Id.
20 0
Atkinson, supra note 15, at 1059; Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Wells Fargo Result-
ing in More Than $175 Million in Relief for Homeowners to Resolve Fair Lending Claims - OPA -
Department of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reachessettlement-wells-fargo
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banksettle.pdf (last visited May 11, 2016).
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prime mortgage mania that preceded the 2008 recession, "black women were
5.7% more likely to receive a subprime mortgage than black men and 256%
more likely to receive a subprime mortgage than white men."2 06 "Latino wo-
men were 12.7% more likely to receive a subprime mortgage than Latino men
and 177% more likely to receive a subprime mortgage than white men." 2 07
Professor Atkinson analyzed a 2014 study that showed that of the top 100
cities that were home to the highest number of homeowners whose homes
were worth less than the debt that encumbered those homes, 71 of those
cities had a population that exceeded 40% black and Latino.2 08
Atkinson also analyzed a study of home foreclosures between 2007 and
2009, which demonstrated that "black and Latino homeowners were 70%
more likely to lose their homes to foreclosure than white homeowners, and
higher income blacks were more than 80% more likely to lose their homes to
foreclosure than similarly situated whites."209
Housing is not the only area in which Professor Atkinson found that
blacks and Latinos face economic headwinds.210 She analyzed a 1995 study
showing that automobile sellers "routinely charged blacks and women higher
prices for cars than white male purchasers."211 She found a later study that
examined "more than 300,000 car loans across 33 states, and it showed that
blacks paid more for cars than white purchasers regardless of creditworthi-
ness."2 1 2 She then turned to a December 20, 2013 settlement between the
DOJ, the CFPB, and Ally Bank, which at that point was the largest auto loan
discrimination settlement in history.2'3 The DOJ and the CFPB alleged that
Ally Bank "discriminated by charging approximately 235,000 black, Latino,
and Asian-Pacific Islander borrowers higher interest rates than white bor-
rowers."214 The agencies claimed that "Ally Bank charged borrowers higher
interest rates because of their race or national origin, and not because of their
creditworthiness or other objective criteria related to borrower risk, and that
the average victim paid between $200 and $300 extra during the term of his
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Ally Bank, however, was not the sole lender engaging in racially discrimi-
natory auto lending.217 On July 14, 2015, the DOJ sued American Honda
Finance Corporation ("AHFC") alleging that "AHFC discriminated by
charging thousands of black, Latino, and Asian-Pacific Islander borrowers
higher interest rates than white borrowers."218 The DOJ and the CFPB
claimed that "AHFC charged borrowers higher interest rates because of their
race or national origin, and not because of their creditworthiness or other
objective criteria related to borrower risk."2 19 The DOJ's complaint also al-
leged that the "average black borrower paid over $250 more during the term
of his or her loan because of discrimination, the average Latino borrower paid
over $200 more during the term of his or her loan because of discrimination,
and the average Asian-Pacific Islander borrower paid over $150 more during
the term of his or her loan because of discrimination."2 20 AHFC paid $24
million to settle the case.2 21
Despite the existence of the FHA and the ECOA, blacks and Latinos face
many daunting and irrational obstacles in conducting ordinary consumer
transactions such as purchasing homes and cars.2 2 2 But discriminatory and
predatory lending practices are not the only challenges blacks and Latinos
face in their attempt to obtain and maintain economic security. Professor
Atkinson analyzed census data, and it showed that in 2010, "black house-
holds had a median income of $32,068, Latino households had a median in-
come of $37,579, and white households had a median income of $54,620."223
She cited a 2011 article demonstrating that "the median income for black
Americans has remained at approximately 60% of the median income for
white Americans for the past four decades."224 The economic recession of
2008 and its aftermath exacerbated the racial income gap.225 Atkinson cited
data showing that "between 2010 and 2013, the median income for non-
white Americans decreased by 9%, while the median income for white Amer-
icans decreased by 1%, and between 1984 and 2009, whites enjoyed an in-
2 17Atkinson, supra note 15, at 1067.
2 18Id.; https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/629806/download (last visited May 11, 2016).
2 19
Atkinson, supra note 15, at 1067; Justice Department and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Reach Groundbreaking Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Auto Lending Discrimination by Honda -
OPA -Department of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-consumer-finan
cial-protection-bureau-reach-groundbreaking-settlement (last visited May 11, 2016).
2 20
Atkinson, supra note 15, at 1067; Justice Department and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Reach Groundbreaking Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Auto Lending Discrimination by Honda -
OPA -Department of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-consumer-finan
cial-protection-bureau-reach-groundbreaking-settlement (last visited May 11, 2016).
221Id.
222
Atkinson, supra note 15, at 1059-60; Warren, supra note 15, at 1792-98.






crease in wealth of $5.19 for every $1 increase in average income compared to
an increase of a mere $.69 for every $1 increase in average income for
blacks."2 26
Atkinson also evidenced that in addition to there being a racial income
gap in the United States, there is a racial wealth gap.2 2 7 Wealth is a more
accurate way to gauge financial security than income because "wealth is seen
first as a personal safety net, or an unspecified amount of money that is stored
away to cushion against he unexpected health crisis, job termination, legal
difficulty, or repair of the family car."2 2 8 Using data from a 2006 article that
Professor Thomas M. Shapiro wrote entitled Race, Homeownership and
Wealth, Professor Atkinson stated that adjusted for 1999 dollars, the "net
wealth of the parents of the typical black family was $46,000, compared to
$200,000 for the parents of the typical white family." 229 This same data
showed that "the total wealth gap between white families and black families
increased from $85,000 in 1984 to $236,500 in 2009."230 Professor Atkinson
states that [i]n 2013, white households had a median net worth of
$141,900; Latino households had a median net worth of $13,700; and black
households had a median net worth of $11,000."231 Put another way, the
median white household had 12.9 times more net worth than the median
black household and 10.36 times more net worth than the median Latino
household.23 2 In the three years before the 2008 recession and the year fol-
lowing it, Latinos lost 66% of their net worth, blacks lost 53% of their net
worth, and whites lost 16% of their net worth.233
Simply put, blacks and Latinos have a demonstrably more difficult time
obtaining and maintaining wealth than their similarly situated white counter-
parts, and this contributes to blacks being more than three times more likely
than similarly situated whites to file bankruptcy and Latinos being almost
twice as likely as similarly situated whites to file bankruptcy.2 34
Race notwithstanding, studies show that if nearly one-half of American
adults encountered an emergency that required $2,000 to address, they could
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accounted for approximately 20% of the wealth held by Americans. Id. at 1063.
2 34
Atkinson, supra note 15, at 1073-75; Warren, supra note 15, at 1786.
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cohort would have to resort to "payday lenders, check cashers, and other
fringe banking institutions."236 "Almost 88 million people in the United
States are 'unbanked'237 or 'underbanked,'"23 8 and these persons also rely on
fringe banking institutions for their banking or credit needs.239
In May 2015, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
published a "Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2014
("Fed Report")."240 The Fed Report revealed that 47% of Americans could
not easily come up with $400 to cover an emergency.241 Fourteen percent
could not come up with that amount at all; 10% would have to sell something
to raise that amount; 18% would have to use a credit card that they could
not pay in full at the next billing cycle; 13% would have to borrow from
friends or family; and 2% would have to use a payday loan.2 42
One member of this "$400 Club" is Neal Gabler, an author and visiting
professor in the Master of Fine Arts Creative Writing and Literature Pro-
gram at the State University of New York, Stony Brook.2 43 In the May 26,
2016 issue of The Atlantic, Mr. Gabler disclosed that he too would not be
able to come up with $400 to pay for an emergency without borrowing or
selling something.244 Mr. Gabler describes himself this way:
I know what it is like to have to juggle creditors to make it
through a week. I know what it is like to have to swallow
my pride and constantly dun people to pay me so that I can
pay others. I know what it is like to have liens slapped on me
and to have my bank account levied by creditors. I know
what it is like to be down to my last $5-literally-while I
wait for a paycheck to arrive, and I know what it is like to
subsist for days on a diet of eggs. I know what it is like to




Id. at 166-67. Fringe banking institutions are those that provide loans that conventional lenders will
not because the loans are too small or too risky. Diane Hellwig, Note, Exposing the Loansharks in Sheep's
Clothing: Why Re-Regulating the Consumer Credit Market Makes Economic Sense, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1567, 1567, 1569 (2005).
" 7"Unbanked" refers to persons who do not have a formal relationship with a bank. Baradaran, supra
note 235, at 166.
238"Underbanked" refers to persons who may have a formal relationship with a bank, but who rely
primarily on fringe banking institutions for their banking or credit needs. Id.
239
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240Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2014. https://www.federalreserve.gov/
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Trouble Finding $400 to Pay for an Emergency. I'm One of Them, The Atlantic, May 26, 2016, http://
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new bills to pay but seldom a check with which to pay them.
I know what it is like to have to tell my daughter that I
didn't know if I would be able to pay for her wedding; it all
depended on whether something good happened. And I
know what it is like to have to borrow money from my adult
daughters because my wife and I ran out of heating oil.
You wouldn't know any of that to look at me. I like to
think I appear reasonably prosperous. Nor would you know
it to look at my r6sum6. I have had a passably good career as
a writer-five books, hundreds of articles published, a num-
ber of awards and fellowships, and a small (very small) but
respectable reputation. You wouldn't even know it to look
at my tax return. I am nowhere near rich, but I have typi-
cally made a solid middle- or even, at times, upper-middle-
class income, which is about all a writer can expect, even a
writer who also teaches and lectures and writes television
scripts, as I do.2 45
He pointed out that financial advisers recommend that people save at
least 10% to 15% of their income for retirement and emergencies, but he goes
on to say that the reason many people cannot save for a "rainy day is that we
live in an ongoing storm. Every day, it seems there is some, new, unantici-
pated expense - a stove that won't light, a car that won't start, a dog that
limps, a faucet that leaks. Four hundred dollar emergencies are not mere hy-
potheticals, nor are $2,000 emergencies. . . The fact is that emergencies al-
ways arise; they are an intrinsic part of our existences. . . Life happens, yes,
but shit happens too. . .".246
Mr. Gabler also discussed how income stagnation contributes to most
Americans' perilous financial states.247 He says that inflation adjusted wages
"peaked in 1972, and since then, the average hourly wage has remained essen-
tially flat."2 48 He also says that "household incomes rose dramatically in the
forty-seven years between 1967 and 2014 for the top quintile of income earn-
ers, and even more dramatically for the top 5%."249 During that same period,
however, "incomes in the middle quintile rose 23.2%; incomes in the second
lowest quintile rose 13.1%; and incomes in the bottom quintile rose
17.8%."250 Income for the "bottom three quartiles peaked in 1999 and 2000,
but since then, incomes in the middle quintile have declined by 6.9%; incomes
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in the second lowest quintile have declined by 10.8%, and incomes in the
lowest quintile have declined by 17.1%."251
A report from May 2016 shows that the combined balances of a majority
of Americans' checking and savings accounts is under $1,000, which means
most people in this country are a health incident or a car problem away from
serious financial distress,252 and it is not true that the reason for this is be-
cause they spend too much money on frivolities.253 Again, Professor Warren's
scholarship on this subject is compelling and insightful.254 In 2004, she pub-
lished The Over-Consumption Myth and Other Tales of Economics, Law, and
Morality.255
In The Over-Consumption Myth, Warren explains that "adjusted for in-
flation, a family of four today spends 21% less on clothing than it did in the
early 1970s," which debunks the idea that people are in debt because they
wasted their money on haute couture.256 She points out that "that same fam-
ily of four does spend more eating at restaurants than it used to, but it spends
a lot less at the grocery store because of bulk purchases and the availability of
generic goods."2 57 It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that families
have the fiscal problems they do because they spend too much money at high-
priced restaurants because even with the restaurant budget being what it is,
"a four person family today spends 22% less on food than that same family
did a generation ago."2 58
Some attribute families' financial woes to overspending on luxury home
goods like "dishwashers, washing machines, dryers, cable or satellite televi-
sion, big screen televisions, and other consumer electronics."259 Professor
Warren rebuts this by observing that "these items were considered luxuries
in 1970, but today, one can find one or more of them in over one-half of the
homes in America."260 Today, people of modest means who own consumer
goods that were once the playthings of the rich are not auditioning for "Lifes-
tyles of the Rich and Famous."2 61 Instead, they have these goods because
they are more widely available and more affordable because the "costs of
21Id.
2s2Robert Reich, The Jaw-Dropping Realities of Our Widening Economic Divide, Reader Supported
News (May 3, 2016), http://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/277-75/36673-the-jaw-dropping-realities
-of-our-widening-economic-divide (last visited May 16, 2016).
2"3Wrren, supra note 17, at 1492-1506.
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manufacturing them has declined, and the goods last longer."2 62 Even with
the proliferation of household appliances that were once the exclusive prov-
ince of the affluent, such as microwave ovens, dishwashers, clothes dryers,
and washing machines, "families spend 44% less on major appliances than
they did a generation ago."2 63 As for vehicles, "in 2004, an average new car
cost $22,000, compared with $16,000 in the late 1970s."264 Today's families
pay more for new vehicles than their parents did, but they drive them for a
longer period as evidenced by the fact that "the average family drives a car
that is more than eight years old" and "a family of four spends 20% less on car
payments, insurance, maintenance and the like than it did a generation
ago."265
So why then are so many people so broke? One answer is housing
costs.266 According to Professor Warren, "in 2004, the median sale price for
an existing home was $150,000, which is 32% higher in inflation adjusted
dollars from 1975, and housing costs consume more of a family's income than
food, cars, health insurance, and child care."267 Another reason why family
budgets are so strained is the ever rising costs of healthcare.268 Professor
Warren's work shows that "in 1972-1973, the average family of four spent
$1,027 on health insurance, but by the early 2000s, that number increased to
$1,650."269 She also notes that "between 2000 and 2002, health insurance
premiums increased by 28.4%."270 In 2012, 1.1 million people filed for per-
sonal bankruptcy.271 As previously noted, the median average monthly in-
come among these filers was $2,743 per month, and their median average
monthly expenses were $2,769, a mere $26 per month difference.272 The me-
plated bathroom fixtures." http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0086750/plotsummary?ref_=TT-ov-pl (last
visited May 15, 2016).
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dian bankruptcy filer in 2012 was $26 per month away from not having to
file bankruptcy.27 3
It is indeed true that many people behave irresponsibly when it comes to
spending.274 But it is a myth that the typical person who finds himself on the
verge of financial collapse owes his plight solely or mostly to overconsump-
tion.2 75 Professor Warren's work shows that "most American families spend
less than they used to on ordinary consumption like consumer goods and
more on the basics of being middle class like housing, healthcare, and trans-
portation."276 It is no easy task to stay afloat financially. A person can be as
morally upright as possible and still find himself in a financial tailspin as a
result of the ordinary vicissitudes of everyday life. Such is the case for the
overwhelming majority of persons who file bankruptcy. The bankruptcy sys-
tem promises them a fresh start, and that promise is broken when a debtor is
qualified for a job, the job can be performed successfully regardless of bank-
ruptcy status, and an employer denies the person a job simply because of his
or her bankruptcy status.
CONCLUSION
It is easy to heap calumny on debtors; after all, every debtor is a person
who ultimately could not pay his or her bills, which means someone whom
the debtor owed will not get paid anything or will get paid very little. Also,
hiring a person to do any job entails some risk, and employers are right to be
risk averse. Employers should not be irrational, however. One of the myths
that persist about debtors is they are fiscal scofflaws who need to be shown
tough love, and if that means they have a harder time getting hired, then so
be it. The typical bankruptcy filer is not helped by being scorned or ridiculed
by those fortunate enough to have steered clear of financial difficulty.
Employers should not deny employment to a person who is or has been a
debtor if personal creditworthiness is not related to successful performance of
the job the person seeks and the person is otherwise qualified. Some employ-
ers use bankruptcy status as a blunt instrument; if a person is or was a
debtor, then he or she does not get the job, period, end of discussion. If an
www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/all/bankruptcy-abuse-prevention-andconsumer-protection-act-
bapcpa/2012/12/31 (last visited July 25, 2017).
27
'Office of Inspector General, United States Postal Service, Providing Non-Bank Financial Services for
the Underserved, at 14, (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-
files/2015/rarc-wp-14-007_0.pdf (last visited May 14, 2016); 2012 Report of Statistics Required by the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (Dec. 31, 2012), at 5, 6, bttp://
www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/all/bankruptcy-abuse-prevention-and-consumer-protection-act-bapcpa
/2012/12/31 (last visited July 25, 2017).
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employer is alarmed by what a bankruptcy might mean about an applicant's
personal characteristics, it is not too much to ask for that employer to investi-
gate a bit further to determine if the applicant actually lacks those character-
istics. Relying on bankruptcy status simpliciter is antithetical to a core
purpose of the bankruptcy system, which is to give debtors a fresh start.
Employers' prerogatives to operate according to whatever employment poli-
cies and practices they wish should be balanced against employees' and poten-
tial employees' right to participate in the labor market in an environment free
of irrational discrimination. It is irrational to deny employment to a person
who is or was a debtor if the person is otherwise qualified, and the job can be
successfully performed regardless of bankruptcy status. To allow such dis-
crimination makes the bankruptcy system's promise of a fresh start illusory.
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